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SPECIAL SECTION: REG ULA TED INDUSTRIES
IN VIRGINIA AND THE 1977 GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE REGULATION OF
UTILITIES BY THE VIRGINIA STATE CORPORATION
COMMISSION: HOW THE COMMISSION MAKES PUBLIC
POLICY WHILE IT MAKES RATES
JOHN T. SCHELL* AND PHILIP SPARKS**
Public utility regulation in Virginia and throughout the United
States is a vehicle for the formation and execution of a significant
portion of government economic policy. The commonly held notion
that utility regulation operates only to "protect the consumer" may
be true in theory, but in practice it is only one aspect of much more
substantial economic activity. Any regulatory commission, includ-
ing Virginia's State Corporation Commission, may find itself "pro-
tecting the consumer" with lower rates while at the same time dam-
aging the consumer with poor energy policy, poor transportation
policy, reduced environmental protection, and reduced service. The
role of utility regulation in the nation's energy crisis demonstrates
these significant, albeit unintended, effects.
Beginning with the Arab oil boycott in the fall of 1973, the United
States has drifted through an unstructured public debate and gov-
ernmental groping designed to establish a national energy policy.
Because electric generation accounts for 25 percent of the nation's
energy consumption,' electric utility regulation policies are crucial
to any coordinated energy policy. In 1974 the new Federal Energy
Office (now the Federal Energy Administration), the Energy Re-
search and Development Administration, and various state and
local energy planning bodies faced the stark reality that much of the
nation's energy supply was controlled by the Federal Power Com-
mission and almost 50 state regulatory commissions.2 Ninety per-
cent of the retail rates of electricity in the nation, which dictate the
electric industry's profits and corporate policies, are regulated pri-
* B.A., Auburn University; J.D., University of Virginia. Formerly Counsel, Consumer
Congress.
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1. Hearings on S. 594 Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on Government Operations on the
Utilities Act of 1975, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1975).
2. Id. at 143.
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marily by state commissions.' In addition, virtually all of our natu-
ral gas production, transportation, and distribution likewise is regu-
lated by independent commissions. Therefore, when one looks at the
Virginia State Corporation Commission as a "protector of the con-
sumer" 4 one also should see its actions in electric and gas rate cases
as affecting Virginia's energy consumption and its energy policies to
a substantial degree.
Perhaps the reason behind the common oversimplification of util-
ity regulation is that the terms "public interest" and "consumer"
are misleading. There is no single monolithic "public interest," but
only the combination of many private interests or concerns. Like-
wise there is no single "consumer" position. Economic activity has
many facets-financial, environmental, political, and social. The
"public interest" is a combination of all of them.
In view of the magnitude of the State Corporation Commission's
role as an instrument of broad economic policies in which it must
weigh many, often competing, considerations, it is appropriate to
inquire how well it makes public policy while it makes rates. This
Article will examine the current structure of utility regulation in
Virginia by the State Corporation Commission, assess the Commis-
sion's efforts and ability to formulate and implement public policy
positions, and suggest appropriate improvements.
3. Describing the federal role in utility regulation, Jack W. Carlson, Assistant Secretary
of the Interior, said: "A number of federal agencies - the FPC, the Treasury, the FEA, the
Department of Commerce and the SEC, in addition to the Department of the Interior - are
concerned with the viability and the regulation of the utility industry and are engaged in
continuous studies of policy options to determine the appropriate federal role." Id. at 10.
4. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 2 provides: "The Commission shall in proceedings before it ensure
that the interests of the consumers of the Commonwealth are represented .... " See also
Newport News & Old Point Ry. v. Hampton Rds. Ry. & Elec. Co., 102 Va. 847, 851, 47 S.E.
858, 859 (1904) (object of creation of the Commission was the protection of public rights).
5. Another example of the economic power of regulatory commissions can be found in the
nation's transportation policy when states and the federal government are attempting to
create a balanced transportation policy, but railroads, trucking, and water carriers are con-
trolled by independent state and federal regulatory agencies. One interesting response to this
problem is found in railroad regulation. The Rail Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act
of 1976, P.L. 94-210, has mandated major reform in the Interstate Commerce Commission's
regulatory process. To make regulation more responsive to broader transportation policy
formualtion, it has, among other things, given the railroads more flexible rate making, re-
quired Department of Transportation review of many Commission actions, established a
permanent rail transportation planning and policy office in the Commission, mandated an
overhaul in Commission accounting and rate making practices, and established a permanent
Office of Public Counsel to develop a broader range of public participation in Commission
proceedings.
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UTILITY REGULATION IN VIRGINIA
Regulation of public utilities in Virginia is established by the
state constitution, in which the State Corporation Commission is
given the power and "charged with the duty of regulating the rates,
charges, and services and . . . the facilities of railroad, telephone,
gas, and electric companies."' Therefore, "utility regulation" refers
to one or more of three separate and identifiable activities: ratemak-
ing, service regulation, and the regulation of facilities. These three
functions often are confused because they are closely interrelated.
For example, a service may depend on a rate level and a rate level
may depend upon facilities construction. A brief discussion of each
term should indicate their differences.
The term "regulate" with respect to rates is defined explicitly in
sections 56-234 and 56-235' of the Code of Virginia, which provide
that public utility rates must be "just and reasonable." As the
Supreme Court of Virginia has recognized, "rates fixed by the Com-
mission should be just and reasonable to the consumers whose rates
are fixed." In other words, the rates should be fixed "in relation to
the Company's costs of serving" the consumers.' "Cost of serving"
utility customers in Virginia is defined as the sum of: (a) all operat-
ing expenses, (b) interest charges on all debt, and (c) a fair return
on equity investment. Therefore, for a rate to be "just and reasona-
ble," it must generate enough revenues to cover (a) and (b) and have
net earnings equal to (c). If the net earnings fail to equal or exceed
(c), the rates are not "just and reasonable."'
In making rates the State Corporation Commission must engage
in two distinct, though interrelated, subfunctions. It must establish
what would be a fair rate of return on the investment committed to
the public service,"' and then it must establish a schedule of tariffs
6. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-234 to -235 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
8. Commonwealth v. VEPCO, 211 Va. 758, 766, 180 S.E.2d 675, 681 (1971).
9. Id.
10. Every utility is allowed a rate of return that at least equals the constitutional minimum
under the fifth amendment prohibition against the taking of property without just compensa-
tion. That minimum has been established by the United States Supreme Court in FPC v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) and Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 690 (1923). Those cases set forth two tests. The return
should be sufficient to allow the utility to attract new capital at reasonable rates if it is
prudently managed, and the return should be comparable to other companies "of like risk."
320 U.S. at 603-05; 262 U.S. at 692-93. The capital attraction standard has been dominant
in Virginia since it was adopted in Petersburg Gas Co. v. City of Petersburg, 132 Va. 82, 89-
1976]
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or prices that will provide the utility with the opportunity to render
adequate utility service and achieve that fair return. Significantly,
a utility only should have an "opportunity" to earn such a return.
This has been described as a "fishing license" because it gives the
utility only the opportunity to earn the return and is no guarantee
that the utility will succeed." Examining the overall profitability of
the enterprise calls for extensive financial, economic, and legal ana-
lyses and is always, essentially, an exercise in informed judgment.
Establishing the price structure or tariffs of the utility is a subjec-
tive exercise involving significant questions of public policy. Regula-
tors determine which customers or classes of customers will be
charged what portion of the operating expenses and fair return of
the company and to what degree those prices will affect those cus-
tomers and their usage of the utility service. 2
The regulation of utility service requires a determination of
whether the service is of an appropriate quality and whether there
is discrimination among customers. 3 Such inquiries can be rather
extensive, covering matters as diverse as the availability of under-
ground electric lines, various telephone service offerings, the defini-
tion of local and long distance telephone calling areas, and customer
policies with respect to deposits, cut-offs for failure to pay, and
equipment repair.
The regulation of a utility's facilities is primarily a function of its
90, 110 S.E. 533, 535-36 (1922). For a full explanation of the determination of a rate of return
see I A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 191-193 (1969).
11. A. PRIEST, supra note 10, at 202.
12. This aspect of the rate case has been a secondary concern in the past. As the Virginia
Supreme Court said in Norfolk v. C & P Tel. Co., 192 Va. 292, 320, 64 S.E.2d 772, 789 (1951):
"Where, how and from what precise source or sources the increased revenue awarded is to be
obtained is primarily an administrative duty and undertaking to be exercised by the Commis-
sion." See also Apartment House Council of Metrop. Washington, Inc. v. PEPCO, 215 Va.
291, 294, 208 S.E.2d 764, 766 (1974). However, since 1970 the enormous growth rate of tele-
phone and electric demand has brought into focus the important role played by rate design
as a stimulator of increased consumption. Therefore it now occupies perhaps the most impor-
tant phase of the proceeding because it is only through reduced growth that consumers can
see any significant decrease in their utility bill. For a discussion of consumer concerns and
actions in this area see Joskow, Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change In
the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation, 17 J. LAW & ECON. 291, 317-22 (1974).
In his discussion of the rate structures of public utilities, Priest suggests that the determi-
nation of a utility's specific charges is for management, with approval by the proper adminis-
trative body. A. PRIEST, supra note 10, at 342-43. Cf. Virginia State Corp. Comm. v. Appa-
lachian Power Co., 65 P.U.R.3d 283, 290 (1966).
13. See generally A. PRIEST, supra note 10, at 227-84 (service), 285-326 (discrimination);
Brasfield, Regulation of Electric Utilities By the State Corporation Commission, 14 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 589, 595-97 (1973).
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ratemaking duties because the construction and utilization of facili-
ties has a substantial impact on the cost of serving customers. 4 The
State Corporation Commission's power, however, goes substantially
further to issues such as power line siting, hydro-electric plant li-
censing, and allocation of territories among utilities. 5
A survey of the broad-ranging activities of the State Corporation
Commission that are subsumed under the term "regulation" reveals
that these functions involve, to a substantial degree, the exercise of
judgment based on the Commission's perception of the public inter-
est. Empirical data and expert opinion are controlling only in deter-
mining the elements of a utility's cost of service. In establishing
prices, regulating service, and controlling physical plant the Com-
mission must make wide-ranging value judgments based on an ap-
propriate combination of what the public wants and what the public
needs. This often is referred to as "legislative" judgment and it
requires an assessment and judgment as to the overall public inter-
est. 7 Most of these decisions should be based on such empirical data
and such testimony as is relevant, but instead they depend largely
upon the State Corporation Commission's own definition of public
policy.
14. See generally A. PRIEST, supra note 10, at 347-78; Brasfield, supra note 13, at 597-99.
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-46.1 (Repl. Vol. 1974) (transmission line siting); Utility Facilities
Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-265.1 to -265.9 (Repl. Vol. 1974); Water Power Act, VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 62.1-80 to -103 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
16. Joskow, The Determination of the Allowed Rate of Return in a Formal Regulatory
Hearing, 3 BELL J. ECON. 632, 634 (1972), suggests a formula in which the judgment of the
commissioners is a primary factor in the rate of return determination. See also Ileo & Parcell,
Economic Objectives of Regulation-The Trend in Virginia, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 547, 566
(1973).
17. The legislative function of the Commission and the attendant wide range of discretion
has been affirmed repeatedly by the Virginia Supreme Court. Appalachian Power Co. v.
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 617, 626, 221 S.E.2d 872, 878 (1976); Howell v. C & P Tel. Co., 215
Va. 549, 557, 211 S.E.2d 265, 270-71 (1975); Apartment House Council of Metrop. Washington
Inc. v. PEPCO, 215 Va. 291, 293, 208 S.E.2d 764, 765 (1974); Princess Anne Util. Corp. v.
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 620, 625, 179 S.E.2d 714, 717 (1971); Washington Holding Corp. v.
County Util. Corp., 207 Va. 729, 734, 152 S.E.2d 50, 54 (1967); City of Lynchburg v. C & P
Tel. Co., 200 Va. 706, 712-13, 107 S.E.2d 462, 467 (1959); City of Newport News v. C & P
Tel. Co., 198 Va. 645, 648, 96 S.E.2d 145, 148 (1957); City of Norfolk v. VEPCO, 197 Va. 505,
514, 90 S.E.2d 140, 147 (1955); Board of Supervisors v. VEPCO, 196 Va. 1102, 1109, 87 S.E.2d
139, 144 (1955); City of Norfolk v. C & P Tel. Co., 192 Va. 292, 299-300, 64 S.E.2d 772, 776
(1951); Clifton Forge-Waynesboro Tel. Co. v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 38, 46-47, 181 S.E. 439,
443 (1935); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Mathieson Alkali Works, Inc., 162
Va. 314, 322, 174 S.E. 85, 88 (1934).
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DETERMINATION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN STATE CORPORATION
COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS
To make the best judgment of the overall public interest, the
State Corporation Commission must make its decision on the most
comprehensive record possible. Rate proceedings should bring forth
the full presentation and documentation of all viable positions on
these issues or it would be simply accidental or fortuitous if the
Commission were able to assess the public interest accurately."s The
State Corporation Commission is not elected by the people; it is
appointed by the General Assembly."9 Other than the informal dis-
cussions members of the Commission have outside the courtroom,
which certainly should not be the basis for regulation, they must
depend upon the parties before them and the Commission staff to
create a complete record upon which they can make their judg-
ments.
Utility rate cases offer a strange amalgam of adversarial and in-
quisitorial fact-finding formats. The public utilities, with their ex-
tensive legal staffs and expert witnesses, participate before the
State Corporation Commission as fully prepared adversaries. Any
student of regulation in Virginia who attends any of the major util-
ity rate cases could only conclude that the preparation and presen-
tation of the utilities is impressive, complete, and compelling. The
Commission can and does act in a partially inquisitorial role, seek-
ing the facts, but the greatest emphasis is placed upon the members
of the Commission as judges and triers of fact who rely upon the
parties to develop and to document the record.
For an adversarial proceeding to be reliable as a fact-finding insti-
tution, it must facilitate an equality of advocates. How can the
public rely upon a proceeding for the determination of facts and the
public interest when one adversary totally and completely overpow-
ers the other by preparation and organization? 0 The virtual pov-
18. The necessity of a complete record in rate regulation cases has been recognized pre-
viously. See Barrett, Public Interest and the Adversary System, 42 ICC PRAc. J. 42, 47-48
(1974); Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadened Public Participation In the A dmin-
istrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525, 530 (1972); Gelhorn, Public Participation In Administra-
tive Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 370-71 (1972).
19. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 12.1-6 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
20. A. Grey Staples, former General Counsel for the State Corporation Commission, in
testimony before the State Senate Commerce and Labor Committee during its 1975 session,
said that:
because consumer representation in utility rate cases is deemed inadequate in
the eyes of most consumers, the regulatory process itself has little credibility
[Vol. 18:73
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erty, at best, and actual non-participation, at worst, of any interests
other than those of the utility and a few large industrial customers
call into serious question the reliability of the regulatory process.
Utilities have obvious incentives to commit substantial resources
to such preparation and presentation. They often have tens or
hundreds of millions of dollars at stake and every utility can recover
the entire costs of its rate case preparation through its rates."' Indi-
vidual, small business, and residential customers have relatively
small individual economic interests and must pay for their entire
case.
When various public interest concerns are not represented at a
hearing, the burden to produce a complete record falls upon the
State Corporation Commission staff. Leaving aside questions of
staff funding and capability, this offers little relief from the lack of
adequate public interest advocates. The Commission, made up of
three members often referred to as "judges," and its staff are the
finders of fact and law and, although the staff may perform as a
party in presenting the results of its investigation, it is neither em-
powered nor should it be allowed to represent the specific view of a
certain class of customers. In any event no true adversary relation-
ship can be created by the Commission's staff when there is no
"arm's length distance between those who investigate and enforce
and those who ultimately decide on the appropriateness of the ac-
tion or decision in question." 2
among Virginia consumers. Even the regulators themselves perceive this as a
problem. Based on my experience in the regulation of Virginia utilities, I would
say that it requires substantive analysis of relatively complex economic, engi-
neering, accounting, financial and environmental issues. The utilities can al-
ways be counted upon by the State Corporation Commission to thoroughly
present their side of the story on these issues. But what about the consumer?
The question of integrity of regulation and the public confidence in the funda-
mental fairness of the regulatory process are as important as the decisions ulti-
mately rendered. I would say to the degree that the residential utility consumer
is not adequately represented in utility rate cases in Virginia, an important side
of the story is missing. And, the public's perception of utility regulation in
Virginia suffers because of it.
For an effective empirical argument that the presence of an intervenor opposing the utility's
position results in outcomes more favorable to the consumer see Joskow, The Determination
of an Allowed Rate of Return in A Formal Regulatory Hearing, 3 BELL. J. ECON. 632, 634
(1972).
21. These expenses are included in the utility's operating costs and passed along to the
customer as part of the rate determination equation.
22. MANAGEMENT OF VIRGINIA STATE GOVERNMENT, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE
COMMISSION ON STATE GOVERNMENTAl. MANAGEMENT at 24 (1975).
Contrast this idea with Pontz & Scheller, The Consumer Interest - Is It Being Protected
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Furthermore, the Commission staff is employed and directed by
the judges themselves, who are charged with "protecting" the pub-
lic interest and not with "representing" it.23 The State Corporation
Commission was established and is charged with the obligation of
"protecting the interest of consumers." But the concept of "protect-
ing" someone's interest is separate and distinct from "representing"
his interest. The distinction is fundamental. In the context of the
Commission's obligation to consumers, it is the difference between
merely providing a forum for regulating certain utilities ("protect-
ing"), and insuring or facilitating consumer participation ("repre-
senting") in agency proceedings. To examine effectively values and
financial data in a rate case, the proceeding must be strongly adver-
sarial. The language of Section 2 of Article IX of the Virginia Consti-
tution requires that consumers be "adequately represented" before
the State Corporation Commission. This language was described in
the 1969 constitutional debates in the House of Delegates: "The key
word there is 'represented.' We did not say 'protected' . . . they
must have representation. There must be an adversary proceed-
ing."24
Further, when there are equal advocates, the public must be able
to rely upon State Corporation Commission procedures to guarantee
a full and complete record. The quality and integrity of regulatory
proceedings and the public's confidence in the fundamental fairness
of the regulatory process are as important as the decisions ulti-
mately rendered. Our legal system is based on the concept that if
parties have had fair opportunity to prepare and present their case
and to cross-examine the opposition's witnesses, the judgment of
the finder of fact shall be binding. The process is relied upon to
assure the most accurate factual determinations. Any failure by the
State Corporation Commission to build the record can only call into
question the adequacy of the record itself as a basis for the determi-
nation of the significant public policy questions before the Commis-
sion.
Virginia law places a few procedural requirements on the State
Corporation Commission. Under Virginia Code section 56-236,2' a
By the Public Utility Commission?, 45 TEMPLE L.Q. 315, 349 (1972).
23. Commissioner Shannon believes otherwise. See Shannon, The Evolution of Virginia's
State Corporation Commission, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 523, 537 (1973).
24. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA HOUSE OF DELEGATES PERTAINING TO AMEND-
MENT OF THE CONSTITUTION, EXTRA SESSION 1969, REGULAR SESSION 1970, 710 (Charles K.
Woltz ed.), reprinted in 2 A. HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 986
(1970).
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-236 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
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utility is allowed to file its new tariffs, and it must give thirty days
notice under section 56-2372s before the tariffs can be changed. The
Commission has the power under section 56-238 to suspend the
tariff changes.27 Therefore, Virginia law only authorizes the Com-
mission, if it wishes, to investigate rates and to establish rates that
would be just and reasonable if it finds existing rates to be unjust
and unreasonable." The procedural requirements of Chapter 5 of
Title 12 of the Code provide only the most skeletal notice and hear-
ing requirements." Under section 12.1-39, the Commission need file
an opinion on a rate increase only if its decision is appealed. No
party is given the right to cross-examine witnesses and there is no
requirement of hearings. 0 If there is a hearing, the Commission
regularly sets a time period for cross-examination of thirty minutes
for each party, regardless of the complexity of the facts or the eva-
siveness of the witness.3 Furthermore, there is no clear burden of
proof placed upon the public utility. The law requires only that the
Commission be satisfied as to the reasonableness of any rate
brought into question.32
Finally, to ensure fair and correct judicial action, triers of law and
fact in our legal system rely upon the establishment of standards
and definitions that circumscribe the power of the agency. For ex-
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-237 (Cum. Supp. 1976). See also VA. CODE ANN. § 56-237.1 (Cum.
Supp. 1976).
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-238 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-234.2 (Repl. Vol. 1974), provides that the Commission can review
the rates of public utilities annually if, "in the opinion of the Commission", it would be in
the public interest.
29. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 12.1-25 to -43 (Repl. Vol. 1973). The primary notice and hearing
requirement is contained in section 12.1-28.
Furthermore, the Commission has the authority to prescribe its own rules of practice and
procedure. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 3; VA. CODE ANN. § 12.1-25 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
30. In contrast to those procedures, Virginia has an Administrative Process Act, VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 9-6.14:1 to -6.14:20 (Cum. Supp. 1976), to regulate the hearing rights and procedures
of many of Virginia's administrative agencies, all of which are substantially less powerful than
the State Corporation Commission. In that Act all parties are given the right to a formal
taking of evidence upon relevant reasonable notice of such proceedings and counsel is given
the express authority "to conduct such cross-examination as may elicit a full and fair disclo-
sure of the facts . . . . the burden of proof shall be upon the proponent or applicant." Id. §
9-6.14:12. The Virginia Supreme Court, in the only reversal of the Commission in modern
times, held that in some instances there is a "procedural due process requirement of a full
hearing." Board of Supervisors v. C & P Tel. Co., 212 Va. 57, 62, 182 S.E.2d 30, 33 (1971).
This holding was confined to that case and has not been recognized generally by the Commis-
sion. See Opinion, Application of VEPCO, Case No. 19426, at 2 (October 1, 1974).
31. See Transcript, Application of VEPCO, Case No. 19426 (July, 1975).
32. See, e.g., City of Lynchburg v. C & P Tel. Co., 200 Va. 706, 107 S.E.2d 462 (1959).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ample, a judge or a jury is given the ability to make findings of fact
based on adequate evidence, but these findings must be made in the
context of a proper definition of the various elements. To find a
criminal guilty a judge must find that each element of the charge
was proved. Likewise, if a grant of power to an administrative
agency is defined by specific standards, the agency must make its
decision in accord with these standards." In practice, however, few
meaningful standards have been provided in grants of power to
administrative agencies. 4
The Virginia Supreme Court has refused repeatedly to reverse the
State Corporation Commission unless the court finds the Commis-
sion clearly has abused its discretion. 5 The Code, however, provides
no specific standards other than the general requirement that the
rates be "just and reasonable." Because the General Assembly has
not exercised its authority to prescribe standards, the Commission
retains broad legislative discretion. Therefore, without such limiting
standards and the resultant difficulty of finding an abuse of discre-
tion, it hardly is surprising that the Commission has been over-
turned only once in the past 50 years.3
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN RECENT UTILITY RATE HEARINGS IN VIRGINIA
Until the 1970's controversy over utility rate cases was extremely
limited. Only a handful of major utility rate cases arose during the
1950's and 1960's and public opposition generally centered around
servicing complaints rather than higher rates. Since the early part
of this decade, a continuing series of rate increases by the state's
largest public utilities has sparked a cycle of protest by consumers
33. See, e.g., Schaffer Trans. Co. v. United States, 355 U.S. 83, 88 (1957).
34. Broad grants of power with few or no controlling standards have been upheld repeat-
edly, both for federal and state administrative agencies. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE §§ 2.01-2.05 (1958). State courts, however, have been somewhat more demanding
in requiring a statement of certain standards for the administrative agency to follow. Id. §
2.07. The Virginia Supreme Court has given support to a requirement of some standards, but
in reality little in the way of substantive standards has been required. See Ours Properties,
Inc. v. Lay, 198 Va. 848, 96 S.E.2d 754 (1957); Butler v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 411, 53
S.E.2d 152 (1949).
Davis, however, does note a trend toward requiring administrative agencies to define their
own standards if the legislature fails to impose sufficient ones to prevent abuses of discretion-
ary power. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 2.00-6, at 27 (1976). For further
discussion of this trend see note 57 infra & accompanying text.
35. Commonwealth v. VEPCO, 211 Va. 758, 767, 180 S.E.2d 675, 682 (1971); Board of
Supervisors v. VEPCO, 196 Va. 1102, 1109, 87 S.E.2d 139, 145 (1955).
36. The reason for the reversal was procedural. Board of Supervisors v. C & P Tel. Co.,
212 Va. 57, 182 S.E.2d 30 (1971).
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across Virginia.3" With the possible exception of court decreed school
busing, no issue has excited greater opposition in Virginia in recent
years.
Although every major Virginia utility has generated some public
criticism because of increased rates, the increases granted the Vir-
ginia Electric & Power Company (Vepco) have been cited frequently
by consumers as a prime example of the failure of the state's regula-
tory system to regulate Virginia's public utilities properly. Indeed,
action by the State Corporation Commission in Vepco rate cases
serves as the focus for most consumer criticism of utility rates."
Arlington and Fairfax counties always have intervened and pre-
sented cases for the consumer, though they have had to rely on
limited budgets. Opposition to utility rate increases by individual
consumers has evolved slowly since the first large requests in 1970.
At first, a few individuals intervened in a number of utility rate
proceedings on behalf of themselves and the consumer, but they also
had limited resources. Like the counties, they have not had access
to the expertise of accountants, economists, fuel experts, and finan-
cial analysts which is needed to mount a truly effective rate case.
These individuals have had to rely instead solely on their own legal
expertise in the utility rate cases in which they have participated.
Since the early 1970's, the Virginia Committee for Fair Utility
Rates has represented the state's large commercial users in utility
rate cases. 9 Although industry has refused to disclose the amount
of money it has spent in opposition to utility rate cases, a reasonable
estimate would place the figure in excess of several hundred thou-
sand dollars.
37. During the 1950's and 1960's utility rates were low and the rate of return was high; now,
however, rates are high but the rate of return is low. This process is analyzed in detail in
Joskow, supra note 12.
38. In the period between 1970 and 1975, Vepco requested $283.7 million in rate relief, and
of that total, the Commission granted $191 million, or 671' of the total rate relief for which it
had applied (State Corporation Commission Case Nos. 18759, 19027, 19342, and 19426). This
fall, the State Corporation Commission is faced with the largest round of utility rate increase
applications in its history. Vepco has requested $66.3 million in additional rates (Case No.
19730) the Appalachian Power Company has asked for and received permission to increase
its rates by $13 million (Case No. 19723), the Washington Gas & Light Company has asked
for $14.2 million (Case No. 19737), and the Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company has
requested $77.2 million in rate relief (Case No. 19696).
39. The group includes Allied Chemical Corporation, American Oil Company, Continental
Can Company, E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., Inc., Firestone Synthetic Fibers, I.C.I. of
United States, Inc., ITT Continental Baking Company, Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry
Dock Company, Narox, Inc., Reynolds Metals Company, J.P. Stevens & Company, Inc.,
Union Camp Corporation, and Anheuser-Busch, Incorporated.
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In 1971, the General Assembly created, within the office of the
Attorney General, the Division of Consumer Counsel, which was
intended as an institutional response to the need for permanent
consumer representation in utility rate cases." It also was seen as a
fulfillment of the constitutional requirement for consumer represen-
tation. However, little additional money was provided the Attorney
General for this mammoth new responsibility. Additionally, the
legal framework under which the Attorney General operates pres-
ents some serious institutional drawbacks.' Because the Division is
charged with the duty of representing "the interests of the people
as consumers," it cannot represent a specific consumer interest that
is in conflict with other consumer interests. Moreover, as noted
earlier, it is overly simplistic to believe that one official or office can
represent all aspects of the multifarious "public interest."
For independent consultants alone, the utilities outspent the At-
torney General 20 to 1 in rate cases between 1970 and 1974. Each
utility has substantial "in-house" accountants and engineers, and
the Attorney General has none; therefore the true disparity must be
much greater. During that period, the Attorney General spent
$169,00011 in utility rate cases while the expenditures of the state's
utilities totalled $3.1 million. 3 The enormous gap in resources is
demonstrated by the figures for 1974. In that year, Vepco alone
spent $921,556 in its rate cases, charging these expenditures to the
consumer as part of the utility's operating expenses,4 while the
Attorney General spent $63,981 in all rate cases in Virginia the same
year.4"
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-133.1 (Repl. Vol. 1973). Under this statute the Division is charged
with the duty of representing the consumer interest before government agencies, specifically
including the State Corporation Commission. The Division is bound to initiate such studies
as may be necessary to protect consumer interests.
41. Compare Howell, Financial Barriers To Public Participation In The Regulatory
Process, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 567, 572 n.23 (1973) (describing the establishment of the
Division as a "laudable concept . . . presently inadequate" to deal with the problems of
representing the consumer interest) with Brasfield, supra note 13, at 595 (describing the
Division as "diligent and effective in carrying out" their duties), and Miller and Massie,
Ratemaking Issues In Virginia: Suggestions For Legislative Clarification, 14 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 601, 610-11 (1973).
42. Information on expenditures provided to authors by Division of Consumer Counsel,
Virginia Attorney General.
43. Information on expenditures provided to authors by the Office of Public Information,
State Corporation Commission.
44. Id.
45. Information on expenditures provided to authors by Division of Consumer Counsel,
Virginia Attorney General.
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The 1974 Vepco application (Case No. 19426) triggered a huge
petition drive in eastern Virginia in opposition to the increased
rates. The petition drive gathered over 40,000 signatures and served
as the starting point for several other independent efforts on the part
of consumers and their representatives to mount an effective case
before the State Corporation Commission against the Vepco re-
quest. In 1975, a group of northern Virginia localities served as the
impetus in the formation of the Virginia Coalition of Local Govern-
ments on Public Utilities4 to coordinate and fund a major interven-
tion on behalf of consumers in the Vepco rate case. It committed
over $100,000 to the case.47 In early 1975, a coalition of various
consumer, neighborhood, and labor groups formed their own organi-
zation called Consumer Congress of the Commonwealth of Virginia
to raise money for an effective residential consumer intervention in
the Vepco case. Drawing support from 9,000 Virginians, Consumer
Congress raised $55,000 to hire its own utility experts for the Vepco
case.4" For the first time, small consumers joined to present a com-
prehensive case to the Commission on their own behalf.
The Vepco application (Case No. 19426) represented the most
structured and methodical opposition to a utility rate request the
Commission ever had witnessed. The Consumer Congress, the Com-
mittee for Fair Utility Rates, the Virginia Coalition, and the Attor-
ney General hired respected expert witnesses to testify against the
rate increase. Additionally, Consumer Congress spent about $25,000
of the money it raised to present a peakload pricing proposal that
it believed would moderate Vepco's growth and thus lead to a stabi-
lization of its rates. In August 1975, after two weeks of hearings, the
Commission granted Vepco an increase of $99 million. In addition,
a $44 million surcharge to be spread over the following four years
was added to Vepco's request to recover costs for nuclear fuel pur-
chases it had made in the past.49
That proceeding demonstrated that even when the public, includ-
ing both small residential customers and Virginia's largest
46. The group was composed of the City of Alexandria, Arlington County, Fairfax County,
Prince William County, Middlesex County, City of Falls Church, Essex County, Gloucester
County, King & Queen County, King William County, City of Norfolk, and City of Char-
lottesville.
47. Information on expenditures provided to the authors by Virginia Coalition of Local
Governments of Public Utilities.
48. The authors participated in the organization of that group. Mr. Schell still serves as
its counsel.
49. Order, Application of Vepco, Case No. 19426 (August, 1975).
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industries, mounts the best effort possible, it falls woefully short.
Not only were public efforts outmatched in the Vepco proceeding,
but also there was virtually no public participation in a concurrent
application of Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, ' "
which received a substantial increase on August 19, 1975. This lack
of participation was because the limited resources of consumers had
been devoted exclusively to the Vepco case.
PROPOSALS To ENSURE ADEQUATE CONSUMER REPRESENTATION IN
STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION UTILITY RATE CASES
In the wake of Vepco's 1974 rate request and the State Corpora-
tion Commission's 1975 decision to grant the rate increase, a num-
ber of state governmental study groups sought to address them-
selves to the problem of providing consumers with adequate, full-
time representation in utility rate cases. Governor Mills E. Godwin,
Jr. appointed a blue-ribbon citizens panel to study the whole prob-
lem of utility regulations in Virginia. The Governor's Electricity
Costs Commission made an extensive study of consumer representa-
tion before the Commission. At the same time, the General Assem-
bly moved forward with reports by the Study Committee on State
Governmental Management and the Joint Subcommittee Study of
Public Utilities recommending reform of utility regulation.
All three reports focused on how to improve consumer representa-
tion in utility rate cases. The final report of the Governor's Electric-
ity Costs Commission recommended the establishment of an inde-
pendent agency to represent consumers in rate cases and recom-
mended the transfer of all consumer advocacy functions to it from
the Attorney General. Noting that the Attorney General "cannot
represent one class of customer against another in electricity rate
cases," the report found an "immediate need" for such an agency.'5
The Joint Subcommittee added:
(Wihen one considers the pervasive influence arising from the
need for energy and utility services, it appears clearly that ade-
quate attention to the interest of consumer protection is needed.
The utilities, with substantial funds to spend in litigation, are
more than any individual or an ad hoc consumer group can cope
with effectively. It appears that our present Consumer Counsel
50. SCC Case No. 19500.
51. FINAj, REPORT OF THE ELECTRICITY COSTS COMMISSION, July 1, 1975, at 7.
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is functioning under a handicap when confronted by the strong
efforts which private utilities are able to muster."
The various legislative and governmental study groups looking at
utility regulation agreed that consumer representation was a key-
stone of utility reform and that it could serve as the foundation for
restoring faith in the regulatory process. The question of what struc-
ture to adopt to guarantee consumer representation in Virginia's
utility regulation system has become an important policy question
facing the General Assembly.
The General Assembly has the power to make the recommended
reforms. The Virginia Supreme Court has described the State Cor-
poration Commission's power in rate making as legislative, meaning
that every Commission decision is regarded as being "prima facie,
just, reasonable and correct" and would stand unless it was shown
to be an "abuse of legislative discretion."53 The court has made it
equally clear that such discretion was based solely on sections 156(f)
and (g) of the now superseded Virginia Constitution as restated in
section 56-235 of the Code of Virginia." Those provisions contained
language establishing a high degree of latitude for Commission ac-
tion. The new Virginia Constitution, however, states: "Subject to
such criteria and other requirements as may be prescribed by law,
the Commission shall have the power and shall be charged with the
duty of regulating. . . ,, 1 As Professor A. E. Dick Howard makes
clear in his Commentaries on the Constitution of Virginia, these new
constitutional provisions give the General Assembly power to set
standards for the Commission:
As to rates, services, and charges, the General Assembly is given
the power to lay down whatever guidelines and criteria it will for
the SCC's exercise of its regulatory function. . . . The Assembly
can, for example, prescribe by statute what factors are to go into
rate-making, what rate of return is to be allowed, and what basis
is to be used to determine the value of plant against which
rate of return is to be computed."
Thus it no longer is true that the State Corporation Commission
enjoys full legislative discretion under the Constitution, for the 1971
52. REPORT OF THE JOINT SUBCOMMITTEE STUDY OF PUBLIC UTILITIES 7 (1976).
53. Board of Supervisors v. VEPCO, 196 Va. 1102, 1109-10, 87 S.E.2d 139, 144 (1955).
54. Id. at 1110, 87 S.E.2d at 144-45.
55. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (1971).
56. 2 A. HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 983 (1974).
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Constitution has given the General Assembly the power to set limits
on that discretion. The only problem is that the General Assembly
has failed to act, leaving the Commission's broad discretion intact."
Virginia, of course, provides only one example of an attempt to
solve the problem of lack of consumer representation. Nationally,
the movement to improve consumer representation in utility rate
cases has taken three forms:
(1) liberalization of the standing requirements for public-
interest litigants to intervene in and to seek judicial review of
agency adjudications;
(2) intervention by state attorneys general in agency proceed-
ings on behalf of consumers; and
(3) creation of offices of consumer counsel with the specific sta-
tutory duty of representation of consumer interests in utility reg-
ulatory proceedings.-8
To fulfill the role required of it as an adequate representative of
consumer interests, any office charged with representing consumer
interests, regardless of how it is organized, funded, or operated,
must satisfy three requirements: (1) it must possess the expertise
57. Professor Davis has called attention to the recent trend of courts requiring administra-
tive rulemaking to provide standards to govern administrative discretion when the legislature
has failed to provide such standards. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 2.00-
6 (1976). "Courts may require administrators to articulate the standards that guide their
discretion. "Id. § 2.00-6, at 27. Davis adopts this position and views the new trend favorably
because it can be the means by which control is maintained over the exercise of discretionary
power. Id. § 2.00, at 20.
Arguably this requirement for administrative agencies to establish the standards by which
they will arrive at their decisions should be applied to the State Corporation Commission.
The failure of the General Assembly to provide even certain limited standards or definitions
leaves an opportunity for abuse. As one court has noted: "One essential element of a properly
made decision is that it accords with previously stated, clearly articulate rules and standards.
This is so because there is a tendency for regulatory systems that operate without clearly
enunciated standards to be inherently irrational and arbitrary." Harnett v. Board of Zoning,
Subdiv. and Bldg. Appeals and Planning Bd., 350 F. Supp. 1159, 1161 (D.V.I. 1972).
Additionally, the State Corporation Commission is not subject to any of the other means
of control usually placed upon administrative agencies. As discussed earlier, the Commission
has few procedural safeguards that could provide protection against arbitrary decisions. See
notes 25-32 supra & accompanying text. The legislature often serves as a check on discretion-
ary administrative action, but the General Assembly has not acted in this respect. A final
means of control used to guard against arbitrary administrative determinations is judicial
review, but effective judicial review of Commission actions does not exist because of the
Virginia Supreme Court's limited view of its role in reviewing Commission action. See note
35 supra & accompanying text.
58. Leflar & Rogol, Consumer Participation in the Regulation of Public Utilities: A Model
Act, 13 HARV. J. LEIs. 235, 244-45 (1976).
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necessary to provide utility consumers with systematic and contin-
uing representation, (2) it must be funded adequately, and (3) it
must be accountable to the consumers it represents and be able to
represent diverse views. Existing initiatives in this area through-
out the nation uniformly fail to satisfy one or more of the require-
ments.
Simple liberalization of standing requirements does not guaran-
tee adequate funding for on-going consumer representation, though
the office might be more responsive to its consumer clients. The 44
states that utilize the Office of Attorney General uniformly find that
his political role prevents him from representing specific constituen-
cies." He often is underfunded and has absolutely no requirement
to be responsible to his customer-clients. The eight states that have
created a special office of "Consumer Counsel" or "Public Coun-
sel" " have established an on-going consumer representation,' but,
depending on state general revenues, the office often is under-
funded" and almost uniformly has no obligation to be responsive to
its customer-clients. 3
One proposal considered by the Virginia State Senate during its
last session 4 is designed to reduce or eliminate the inherent defects
in existing consumer representation and to meet the three require-
ments mentioned above. The Senate bill would create a Residential
Utility Consumers' Council that would be charged as an advocate
to represent the interests and needs of residential consumers. This
Council would be funded through a special check-off space on every
utility bill that would allow the utility customer to make a volun-
59. Id. at 247-50.
60. These are Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-2a (Cum. Supp. 1976)("Consumer
Counsel"); District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. § 43-205 (Cum. Supp. 1976) ("People's
Counsel"); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 350.061 - .0614 (Cum. Supp. 1976) ("Public Coun-
sel"); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 93-301a to -307a (Cum. Supp. 1975) ("Consumer's Utility
Counsel"); Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT. § 8-1-1-4 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1976) ("Public Coun-
selor"); Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, §§ 14-15B (Repl. Vol. 1975) ("People's Counsel");
Missouri, Mo. Ann. Stat. § - ("Public Counsel"); Montana, MONT. REV. COD. ANN. §§
70-701 to -711 (Cum. Supp. 1975) ("Consumer Counsel").
61. In each of these states the Consumer Counsel is charged with the duty of representing
the consumer's interest before administrative agencies, thus providing an institutionalized
means of consumer participation and overcoming the lack of continuity problem inherent in
individual challenges.
62. See Leflar & Rogol, supra note 58, at 251 & nn.69-71.
63. The "Consumer Counsel" is not elected by the people in any of these jurisdictions. He
is appointed either by the Governor (Connecticut, Indiana, and Maryland), a legislative
committee (Florida and Montana), or some administrative official (District of Columbia
(Commissioner) and Georgia (Attorney General)).
64. S.B. 509, 1975 Sess.
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tary contribution with his monthly utility payment. The utilities
would accumulate the voluntary contributions and transfer them to
the Council. Collection costs would be paid for by the Council itself.
Each contributor would become a member of a non-profit corpora-
tion and could vote to elect Council directors, thereby influencing
policy decisions. The directors, in their fiduciary roles, would be
charged with the responsibility of spending the funds accumulated
and could hire a full-time staff of lawyers, accountants, economists,
engineers, and other specialists to appear before the State Corpora-
tion Commission. The Council would provide institutionalized, on-
going organization for representing residential consumers in utility
rate matters. It would be empowered, if it found diverging residen-
tial utility consumer views, to fund additional intervenors, all with
the purpose of building a complete record and bringing all signifi-
cant issues before the Commission.
The funding mechanism is another unique aspect of the proposal.
It would allow consumers to contribute voluntarily, thereby promot-
ing public participation and involvement. And, because the Con-
sumers' Council would not depend upon general revenues of the
state, it would not cost the taxpayers any money. Although it is
impossible to judge the amount of money that would be voluntarily
contributed by consumers to the Council, even the utilities believe
that it would be a significant amount. 5 If the experience of Con-
sumer Congress is any guide, financial resources would not be a
problem. Consumer Congress raised $55,000 over a period of a few
short months by utilizing volunteers who solicited contributions
door-to-door.- A check-off provision would provide a much easier
and more regular method of collecting voluntary funds. The finding
mechanism also provides an additional degree of responsiveness to
consumer needs. If consumers had confidence in the Consumers'
Council they would contribute to it, and if they lost confidence they
simply could cease contributing. Additionally, the creation of the
Consumers' Council could insure that consumers have adequate
representation that would be free from the political infighting that
can characterize the annual state budget process.
65. Testimony on February 16, 1976 in Richmond, Virginia, by utility officials opposed to
S.B. 509 during hearings before the Senate Commerce and Labor Committee estimated that
the Consumers' Council was capable of raising anywhere from several hundreds of thousands
of dollars to a million dollars annually.
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CONCLUSION
The General Assembly unquestionably should undertake a care-
ful examination of existing substantive and procedural ratemaking
standards, which are too broad at present. But this is not enough,
because the crux of the rate regulation problem is lack of consumer
representation. The need for the consumer's voice to be heard in
utility rate cases never has been greater than it is now. If the regula-
tory system is to remain credible to the citizens it serves, it must
guarantee a true adversary procedure between consumers and the
utilities in rate hearings. That guarantee can be fulfilled only if well
financed public participation in utility rate cases becomes a part of
utility regulation and if the State Corporation Commission recog-
nizes its obligation to seek out and promote full participation by all
interest groups in utility rate cases.
